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Temporally aggregated data is a bane for Granger causality tests. The same set of variables may lead to 
contradictory causality inferences at different levels of temporal aggregation. Obtaining temporally 
disaggregated data series is impractical in many situations. Since cointegration is invariant to temporal 
aggregation and implies Granger causality this paper proposes a sign rule to establish the direction of 
causality. Temporal aggregation leads to a distortion of the sign of the adjustment coefficients of an error 
correction model. The sign rule works better with highly temporally aggregated data. The practitioners, 
therefore, may revert to using annual data for Granger causality testing instead of looking for quarterly, 
monthly or weekly data. The method is illustrated through three applications. 
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A number of theoretical studies have established that temporal aggregation leads to 
misleading inference on Granger-causality (see Wei, 1990 and Marcellino, 1999 and 
references therein). Gulasekaran and Abeysinghe (2002) and Gulasekaran (2003) have 
derived quantitative results analytically to assess the nature of the distortions created. 
Overall the following conclusions emerge. Within a stationary framework, depending on 
the parameter magnitudes, temporal aggregation may (i) create a spurious feedback loop 
from a unidirectional relation, (ii) erase a feedback loop and create a unidirectional 
relation and (iii) erase the Granger-causal link altogether. The distortions magnify when 
differencing is used after temporal aggregation to induce stationarity.  
These findings of distortions are not much of a comfort  in practice because most 
available data series are either temporally aggregated or systematically sampled 
depending on whether the variables are flows or stocks respectively. An important 
finding of the Gulasekaran (2003) study is that misleading inferences are more likely at 
low levels of temporal aggregation. Therefore, moving towards more disaggregated data 
would not be of much help either unless the observation frequency coincides with the 
causal lag. Looking for data with a frequency that coincides with the causal lag is a far-
fetched goal. Moreover, for certain variables such as GDP, there is a limit to the increase 
in the frequency of observations beyond which meaningful time series aggregates do not 
exist. (See Hoover, 2001, Chapter 6 for an eloquent discussion on this.) On the other 
hand, temporal aggregation creates contemporaneous correlations even when such   3 
correlations are absent in the non-aggregate process and as temporal aggregation 
increases contemporaneous correlations may be all that is left between the series. As a 
result one may not find Granger-causality at all. Making causal inferences from 
contemporaneous correlations is a challenging and much needed task. For better or worse 
this task still remains largely in the terrain of non-sample information or beliefs of the 
researcher. 
Hoover (2001) has proposed a very promising methodology for causal inference 
based on an intervention analysis. Using the logic that interventions such as strikes, wars, 
and policy changes do not alter a true causal relationship, Hoover suggests examining 
conditional and marginal distributions to see whether they are affected by interventions. 
The applications he has reported, however, rely on error correction (ECM) formulations 
which are unfortunately subject to the distortions of temporal aggregation. Hoover’s 
approach is closely related to testing for super exogeneity (see Hendry, 1995). 
Swanson and Granger (1997) have used a graph-theoretic approach advocated by 
philosophers and computer scientists (see Pearl, 2000) to assign a causal ordering to 
contemporaneous links in a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model. Demiralp 
and Hoover (2003) have examined the reliability of this approach and conclude that the 
graph-theoretic approach combined with non-sample i nformation may lead to a more 
realistic causal ordering. This approach, the SVAR approach in general, faces a number 
of difficulties under temporal aggregation. First, the results in Gulasekaran and 
Abeysinghe (2002) and Gulasekaran (2003) indicate that though unidirectional relations 
create contemporaneous correlations with an unambiguous sign, an ambiguity may arise 
if the non-aggregate process is a feedback relation with a positive and negative feedback   4 
loop. Depending on the parameter configuration of t he non-aggregate process, the 
contemporaneous correlation of the aggregate process may take positive, negative or zero 
values from which it would be difficult to infer the actual feedback relation that exists 
(see also Ericcson et al., 2001).
1 Second, since causal ordering is performed on the basis 
of residuals of an unrestricted VAR there is a possibility that the lagged variables in the 
unrestricted VAR acting as proxies for the omitted contemporaneous relations thereby 
leading to distorted residual correlations. Therefore, the final causal ordering may have to 
be done by estimating the full SVAR model. Third, even if the causal ordering of 
contemporaneous links is done successfully, temporal aggregation may distort the 
dynamics of the VAR model in such a  way that the impulse responses may become 
misleading (Granger, 1988; Granger and Swanson, 1992; Marcellino 1999). 
Unlike dynamic relations, cointegrating relations remain invariant to temporal 
aggregation (Granger, 1990;  Pierse and Snell, 1995; Granger and Siklos, 1995; Franses 
and Boswijk; 1996; Marcellino, 1999). They are also not affected by linear seasonal 
filters (see Hendry, 1995, Section 15.6 and the references therein). Cointegration also 
implies G -causality (Granger, 1986) though the direction is uncertain. Establishing the 
direction of causality from a cointegrating relation is an important research agenda and 
some apparatus under weak exogeneity already exists for this purpose (Engle et al., 1983, 
Hendry 1995, Johansen 1995).  As  the level of temporal aggregation increases, a 
stationary VAR(p) process may tend towards VAR(0) by absorbing all causal 
information into contemporaneous links. However, a cointegrated VAR(p) process 
                                                 
1  For example, since early 1980s (until the onset of the Asian financial crisis) the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore has used exchange rate management as a means of controlling inflation. Higher imported 
inflation prompts for an appreciating exchange rate policy that in turn lowers the inflation rate. Therefore, 
the two variables form a positive and negative feedback loop.  However, the observed data hardly show this 
relationship.   5 
cannot shrink below  VAR(1) because of the presence of unit roots.
2 As a result some 
adjustment coefficients of the error correction model have to remain non-zero regardless 
the level of temporal aggregation. Therefore, weak exogeneity under cointegration helps 
not only in contemporaneous conditioning but it also helps in Granger causality 
inference.  
Since it is of critical importance to make causal inference from relations that are 
invariant to temporal aggregation and given the impracticality of searching for the non-
aggregate forms of the data series we propose to base causal inference on highly 
aggregated data series such as the annual series that are cointegrated and best modeled as 
a  VAR(1) process though higher order VAR models may also be entertained
3 (see 
footnote 6 and Section 5). The objective of our study is to investigate the feasibility of 
this proposal.
 It is worth noting that Pagan (1989) came up with a scathing criticism of 
Granger causality inference because of the inconceivably contradictory results found in 
the applied literature. The fragility of causal inference emanates mainly from two 
sources,  (i) the information set used and  (ii)  temporal aggregation.
4 The former is a 
problem that all econometric models have to deal with and the latter requires devising 




                                                 
2  If  n l l l ,..., , 2 1  are the roots of the non-aggregate autoregressive process then 
m
n
m m l l l ,..., , 2 1  are the 
roots of the aggregated process, where m is the order of aggregation (Marcellino, 1999). 
3  The problem with unrestricted higher order VAR models is that they tend to pick noise as signal leading 
to fragile inference. 
4  Other sources include the incorrect functional forms, in particular not accounting for the multiplicative 
interaction between the variables that economic theory some times suggests.   6 
2. Analytical Tools 
Consider the ECM formulation (Johansen, 1995): 
t t p t p t t t t e D y y y y y + + D G + + D G + D G + ¢ = D - - - - - - f b a ) 1 ( 1 2 2 1 1 1 ...     (1) 
where  t y ( T t ,..., 2 , 1 = ) is an  ) 1 ( · n  vector of I(1) variables,  t D  contains deterministic 
terms such as the constant and time trend and  t t y u b¢ =  is an  ) 1 ( · r  vector of 
cointegrating relations. Note that  ￿ = ) ( t e Var  is not a diagonal matrix in general. If we 
can impose a meaningful causal ordering on the contemporaneous relations such that 
t t e B e = 0  and  W e = ) ( t Var  is diagonal, where  t e  are the fundamental innovations, then 
we can formulate a structural ECM by pre-multiplying (1) by  0 B . This will altera , but 
not  b .
5  The problem is that temporal aggregation alters a  and  G s and if this happens 
in a distortionary way meaningful inference may not result even if the restrictions on B0 
turn out to be correct. Since our focus in this paper is on a  we assume that the data series 
are sufficiently temporally aggregated such that  G s in the aggregated process are 
practically zero and we work with the model:
6  
t t t e y y + ¢ = -1 b a D .                 (2) 
For the convenience of subsequent derivations we have dropped the deterministic term 
from (2). 
                                                 
5  Usually structural VAR modelers are estimated by imposing diagonality on  W . Ideally W should be 
diagonal empirically because W may truly be non-diagonal due to omitted variables and misspecified 
contemporaneous links. 
6   Johansen (1995) argues, based on experience, that seasonally adjusted quarterly data are often well 
modeled as VAR(2). If longer lags are required he suggests to look for omitted variables and increase n 
instead of p. For example, consider that the n variables are well modeled as a VAR(1) process. If we throw 
away half of the variables then the remaining half requires a VARMA(2,1) model instead of a VAR(1). If 
model diagnostics do not warrant a VAR(1) because of  autoregressive effects we could still proceed with a 
higher order VAR provided that the G s are empirically diagonal.   7 
As stated earlier, cointegration (also unit roots) is invariant to temporal aggregation. 
This is in general true for static relations. Note also that if y consists of both flow and 
stock variables we have to apply the same transformation, temporal aggregation or 
averaging, to all the variables to keep  b  invariant. Therefore, it is advisable to use 
temporal averaging of all the variables when both flow and stock variables enter the same 
model.  Since  b  is invariant to temporal aggregation we proceed with the assumption 
that  b  is known and concentrate on a.  
If the n variables are partitioned into two groups such that  t y1 is (n1·1) and  t y2 is 
(n2·1), n1+n2=n with a  and  b  split conformably then the ECM can be written as 



















































.             (3) 
Johansen (1995, Ch. 8) shows that if  0 2 = a  then  t y2  is weakly exogenous for  b  and  1 a . 
Writing (3) in levels it can be seen that  0 2 = a (assuming  b „0) also implies the presence 
of Granger causality from  t y2 to  t y1  (Mosconi and Giannini, 1992) though we cannot 
exclude the possibility of lagged feedback effects since they may have disappeared into 
contemporaneous links. Following Hendry and Mizon (1998) Granger causality 
associated with the adjustment coefficients may be referred to as causality in levels and 
that associated with short-run coefficients as causality in differences. Although the 
former implies the latter, the converse does not necessarily hold. Results in this study as 
well as those in Gulasekaran (2003) indicate that causality in levels is more robust to 
temporal aggregation compared to causality in differences. Since causality in levels bears 
on weak exogeneity that forms the basis for super exogeneity which is essential for policy   8 
evaluations the causality in levels plays an important role in practice. Since policy 
variables are, in general, subject to feedback effects, causality in differences does not 
play such a useful role in policy evaluations. 
 
2.1 The sign of the adjustment coefficient 
During our analysis we realized that the sign of the a coefficients plays a useful role 
in signaling how temporal aggregation has affected them. Johansen (1995) draws 
attention to “correct” and “wrong” signs of the adjustment coefficients in a number of 
places. In this section we define the “correct sign” formally for  1 = r  and discuss the 
consequences of “wrong sign”.   
When  1 = r , the ith equation of (2) can be written as  
  it t i it it e u y y + + = - - 1 1 a ,              (4)   





it i t y u
1
b .          
The long run equilibrium implies that  0 1 = - t u  which gives:    
  ) .... ... (
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 - - + + - - - - - - + + + + + +
-
= t n n t i i t i i t t
i
it y y y y y y b b b b b
b
.   
If the system is in disequilibrium at date  1 - t  then either  0 1 > - t u  or  0 1 < - t u .    9 
Case 1:  0 > i b  
If  0 1 > - t u , then  ) .... ... (
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 - - + + - - - - - - + + + + + +
-
> t n n t i i t i i t t
i
it y y y y y y b b b b b
b
 and 
we expect  0 1 < - t iu a  in (4) in order to achieve the equilibrium. Since  0 1 > - t u ,  i a  has to 
be negative ( 0 < i a ).  
If  0 1 < - t u , then  ) .... ... (
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 - - + + - - - - - - + + + + + +
-
< t n n t i i t i i t t
i
it y y y y y y b b b b b
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and we expect  0 1 > - t iu a  in (4) in order to achieve the equilibrium. Since  0 1 < - t u ,  i a  
has to be negative ( 0 < i a ). 
Thus, if  0 > i b , then  0 < i a  regardless of the sign of the disequilibrium term  1 - t u .  
 
Case 2:  0 < i b  
If  0 1 > - t u , then  ) .... ... (
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 - - + + - - - - - - + + + + + +
-
< t n n t i i t i i t t
i
it y y y y y y b b b b b
b
 
and we expect  0 1 > - t iu a  in (4) in order to achieve the equilibrium. Since  0 1 > - t u ,  i a  
has to be positive  ( 0 > i a ). 
If  0 1 < - t u , then  ) .... ... (
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 - - + + - - - - - - + + + + + +
-
> t n n t i i t i i t t
i
it y y y y y y b b b b b
b
 
and we expect  0 1 < - t iu a  in (4) in order to achieve the equilibrium. Since  0 1 < - t u ,  i a  has 
to be positive ( 0 > i a ). 
Thus, if  0 < i b , then  0 > i a  regardless of the sign of the disequilibrium term,  1 - t u .    10 
We can, therefore, see that the long-run equilibrium holds if the sign of  i a  is the 
opposite of  i b . We define this as the “correct sign” of the adjustment coefficient when 
1 = r . Since the  b  vector is invariant to temporal aggregation we can determine the 
expected sign of  i a  from that of  i b  under any level of temporal aggregation. This will be 
termed as the “sign rule”. 
The problem, however, is that the long-run equilibrium may hold even if the sign is 
wrong. To see this, from the n equations in (4) obtain   t t t u u e r + = -1 , where  b a r ¢ + =1 , 
) ,..., ( 1 ¢ = n a a a ,  ) ,..., ( 1 ¢ = n b b b  and  t e  is white noise. Co-integration requires  1 < r  
which implies  0 2 < ¢ < - b a . Note that  r  measures the degree of co-integration:  0 ﬁ r  
implies a higher degree of co-integration and  1 ﬁ r  implies a lower degree.  Now 
consider that the variables in the model are arranged such that the first n 1  b  coefficients 
are positive and the second n2 b  coefficients are negative. Let  1 b  and  2 b represent these 
vectors and let the corresponding a vectors be  1 a  and  2 a  respectively. Assume that  1 a  
is correctly signed with a negative sign and  2 a  is wrongly signed with a negative sign 
too. Given the inequality  0 2 2 2 1 1 < ¢ + ¢ < - b a b a , if  2 2 1 1 b a b a ¢ > ¢  we get  1 < r  even 
with the wrong sign. In other words, if the adjustment towards equilibrium is dominated 
by the adjustment coefficients with the correct sign co-integration continues to hold. 
However, the wrong sign lowers the degree of co-integration (increases the absolute 
value of  r ). How frequent the co-integration with the wrong sign is an empirical 
question. As we shall see later the verification of this would not be easy with temporally 
aggregated data.   11 
2.2 Bivariate Case 
The sign rule seems to apply even when  1 > r  provided that the r cointegrating vectors 
do not appear jointly in an equation. However, when they enter an equation jointly the 
sign rule does not seem apply. Since the results are not very clear at this stage, in the 
following analysis we confine to the case  1 = r  and use a bivariate system to obtain some 
analytical results under temporal aggregation. We assume that the non-aggregate process 
is in the form of (3) with the resulting two equations written as
7 
 
t t t e u y 1 1 1 1 + = D - a ,                (5) 
t t t e u y 2 1 2 2 + = D - a ,                (5¢) 













































t .  
The zero contemporaneous covariance between the two error terms underlies the 
assumption that the observation frequency coincides with the causal lag. As before 










2 s b s b s e + = .  
Let  t t y w 1 1 D =  and  t t y w 2 2 D = . For i=1,2, the variances and covariances of the non-
aggregate process in (5) and (5¢) can be written as  
k u u E u u E k
k
k t t k t t u " - = = = + - ) 1 /( ) ( ) ( ) (
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  Let  t 1 Y and  t 2 Y  ( )   ; ,.., 2 , 1 mN T N = = t  be the m-period non-overlapping aggregates of 
t y1 and  t y2  respectively and let  t t D 1 1 Y W =  and  t t D 2 2 Y W = . We now consider estimating 
the following aggregated process:  
    t t t a 1 1
*
1 1 E U W + = -                 (10) 
t t t a 2 1
*












j u U  and t i E  represent non-overlapping sums of the error process.
8  
The OLS estimates 
* ˆi a , 
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8  In addition to temporal aggregation we also examined systematic sampling. In general, systematic 
sampling does not lead to serious distortions in the adjustment coefficients. In the interest of space we 
present the results for temporal aggregation only. 
   13 
Using  Proposition A.1 in Appendix that establishes the relationship between 
covariances of the aggregated and the non-aggregate processes we get the following 
relations, again for i=1,2: 
   k m mk L L k u
m
U " - + + + + =
- )) 1 ( ( ) ... 1 ( ) (
2 1 g g .        (14) 
k m mk L L k iu
m
iU " - + + + + =
- )) 1 ( ( ) ... 1 ( ) (
3 1 g g         (15) 
)) 1 ( 2 ( ) ... 1 ( ) (
4 1 - + + + + =




ii g g .        (16) 
These expressions provide the link between the parameter estimates and the t-statistics of 
the aggregated process and the parameters of the non-aggregate process in order to derive 




There are three cases of interest with regard to Granger causality in the non-aggregate 
process: (i) no causality, (ii) unidirectional causality and (iii) mutual causality or 
feedback. The first case clears through without a problem. If the two series are not related 
in the non-aggregate process then  , 0 = i a   2 , 1 = i , and from (9),  0 , 0 ) ( > " = k k iu g .  
Further, from (15)  0 , 0 ) ( > " = k k iU g  and from (11)  0 ˆ
* = i a . Thus, if there is no Granger 
causality between the series in the non-aggregate process then there will be no Granger 
causality between them in the aggregated process. In fact, this is valid for the short run 
dynamics as well (Gulasekaran, 2003).  
 
 
   14 
3.1 Unidirectional Causality in the non-aggregate process 
To evaluate this case we set  0 2 = a  so that Granger causality runs from  t y2  to  t y1  and 
use the normalized co-integrating vector  ) , 1 ( 2 b . We consider m=3 and m=12 to represent 
aggregating monthly data to quarterly and annual figures.
9 To assess the impact of the 
degree of co-integration we consider values of  r  in the range -0.95 to 0.95. This is the 
same as setting  ) 1 ( 1 - = r a  within the range –1.95 to –0.05. We also vary the values of 
2 b  within the range -20 to 20 to see whether the magnitude of  2 b  plays any role in 
creating distortions. For the computation of the  t statistics we consider three 
combinations of m and N given in Tables 2 and 4.
10 
Co-integration implies that at least one of the adjustment coefficients has to be non-
zero. As expected, 
*
1 ˆ a  remains negative and highly statistically significant regardless the 
level of aggregation and the sample size (Tables 1 and 2). The magnitude of  2 b  seems to 
matter when  1 a  is very small.   
The interesting case is 
*
2 ˆ a  which is expected to be statistically insignificant. The 
results for 
*
2 ˆ lim a p  are given in Table 3 and the t-statistics in Table 4. Table 3 shows that 
the limiting values of 
*
2 ˆ a  are not zero, though small in magnitude for certain cases 
especially when m=3. The magnitude of both  1 a  and  2 b  play a role in the creation of a 
non-zero
*
2 ˆ a . Nevertheless Table 4  shows that the impact of the magnitude of  2 b  
                                                 
9  Since monthly data are the aggregates of daily or hourly data we have to set m to very large values which 
render our analytical expressions unmanageable. 
10 These sample sizes are chosen to be compatible with the Monte Carlo experiments in Lahiri and 
Mamingi (1995), Choi and Chung (1995) and Mamingi (1996). Since we compute t statistics using the 
limiting values of the parameter estimates we conducted a limited number of Monte Carlo experiments 
(with 10,000 replications) to assess the validity of our theoretical results for the sample sizes considered. 
The Monte Carlo results are the same as our theoretical results.   15 
disappears from the t statistics. However, when  1 a  is close to -1 (high degree of co-
integration) the t statistics are highly significant regardless the level of aggregation and 
the sample size. An increase in m or N renders more statistically significant t statistics. 




A comparison with the results in Gulasekaran and Abeysinghe (2002) for a non-
cointegrated VAR indicates that the distortionary effects of temporal aggregation are 
much stronger on the adjustment coefficients than on the stationary dynamics. This 
means that if weak exogeneity tests are used to impose a causal ordering on the 
contemporaneous relations they are more likely to go wrong with temporally aggregated 
data. The most important observation, however, is that the sign of 
*
2 ˆ a  is the same as that 
of  2 b  though we expect the opposite. This is a clear indication that a distortion may have 
taken place. 






* ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ b a b a r + + = . For example, when  1 a =-0.25,  r =0.75 but 
* ˆ r  = 
0.56 for m=3 and 
* ˆ r =0.19 for m=12 regardless the magnitude of  2 b  ( 1 b =1).
11  As it was 
noted earlier the wrong sign lowers the degree of cointegration. In this case, however, 
temporal aggregation seems to offset this effect and produces a high degree of 
cointegration even with the wrong sign.  
                                                 
11 Note that we need more decimal places in Tables 1 and 3 to obtain precise values of 
* ˆ r . 
   16 
3.2 Mutual Causality in the non-aggregate process  
In this case both  1 a  and  2 a  take non-zero values, therefore, the focus of our 
computations is to see whether temporal aggregation renders one of them zero in the 
aggregated process leading to misleading inference on causal direction.  It is worth noting 
that even if we correctly find that they are non-zero, this is not going to help us in 
assigning a causal order to the contemporaneous link. We will have to look for a third 
variable to solve the identification problem. 
Since  2 1 2 / ) 1 ( b a r a - - =  the computational setting in this case is a lot more 
involved than the previous one. We computed a large number of tables using various 
combinations of the parameter values. To conserve space we present only one table and 
summarize the results. In all computations we fixed  1 a  to the range -0.95 to -0.05. 
Overall 
*
1 ˆ a  emerges with the correct sign and remains  statistically significant. 
Insignificant values occur only when | 1 a | is small. Table 5 presents the t statistics for 
*
2 ˆ a  
under one set of parameter configuration. In this table  2 a  is positive and varies from cell 
to cell but takes on smaller values towards the top-left corner. What the table shows is 
that temporal aggregation may render small  2 a s either with statistically insignificant 
*
2 ˆ a s 
or with statistically significant 
*
2 ˆ a s with a wrong (negative) sign. The latter effect 
magnifies as temporal aggregation increases. In general, distorted inference do not occur 
when both  1 a  and  2 a  are large in magnitude.  
================ 
Table 5 
================   17 
4. How to Test for Granger causality with temporally aggregated data? 
Although temporal aggregation tends to distort the adjustment coefficients, the sign rule 
established in Section 2 and the computations in Section 3 show that we may still be able 
to reach the correct conclusion about the causal direction based on the sign of the 
adjustment coefficients. To repeat the sign rule, if  0 > i b ,  0 < i a  and if  0 < i b ,  0 > i a . 
The results on unidirectional causality are clear-cut. The non-zero adjustment 
coefficient remains highly significant regardless the level of temporal aggregation and 
carries the correct sign. An adjustment coefficient with the wrong sign clearly indicates a 
causal distortion of the underlying zero coefficient.  However, the presence of mutual 
causation makes the inference harder because of the possibility that temporal aggregation 
may erase the feedback loop and creates  a unidirectional relation. Our results 
nevertheless show that a strong feedback relation does not get distorted by temporal 
aggregation. Furthermore, when  1 a  is reasonably large 
*
1 ˆ a  always carries the correct sign 
and remains statistically significant. Therefore, a proper normalization (a selection of the 
dependent variable) with the help of non-sample information should make the inference 
easier. Wrong sign on the other coefficients is an indicator of causal distortion. 
Unfortunately we face an ambiguity here. Our results show that 
*
2 ˆ a  may take the wrong 
sign either because  2 a  is very small or zero or because  2 a  genuinely carries a wrong 
sign.
12 Although the latter case may only be a theoretical possibility, in practice, with 
temporally aggregated data we will not be able to differentiate between these 
                                                 
12  Note that, as shown in Section 3, when  2 a  takes the wrong sign its magnitude has to be smaller than 
that of  1 a to preserve co-integration.   18 
possibilities. We have to rely on non-sample information to solve this identification 
problem. We can, therefore, formulate the following rule as a guide. 
 
First, determine the expected sign of the adjustment coefficients from the estimated co-
integrating vector. If the estimated adjustment coefficient appears with the correct sign 
and is statistically significant then it reflects the underlying causal direction in the non-
aggregate form. If the coefficient appears with the wrong sign then a causal distortion 
may have occurred and if such a conclusion is supported by non-sample information then 
we may treat it as resulting from a zero or near zero coefficient in the non-aggregate 
form.  
 
5. Some Monte Carlo Results 
An upshot of the above analysis is that afterall we may be better off with highly 
temporally aggregated data for causality testing. The trend has been to move towards 
more and more disaggregated data but with no promising outcome on Granger causality 
inference. Annual data, on the other hand, are free from the effects of seasonal 
adjustment and may well fit into a VAR(1) framework. Since co-integration has to render 
at least one non-zero adjustment coefficient with the correct sign, the sign distortions on 
the other coefficients, perhaps combined with non-sample information, would guide us in 
establishing the causal direction. 
To shed further light on the VAR order and the sign distortion we conducted a Monte 
Carlo experiment with a VAR(2) process which in ECM format is: 









































































.    (17)   19 
In this process  2 a =0, therefore y2 is weakly exogenous for  1 a  and  b  vector. However, it 
is a feedback system if  0 21 „ f . In the experiment we set  21 f to two values (0, 0.25). 
Summary results based on N(0, I) errors and 2000 replications are given in Tables 6 and 
7. To see the large sample effect we set the effective sample size (N) to 480 at each level 
of aggregation. 
As for the VAR order selection, SBC tends to choose VAR(1) more often as m 
increases. However, AIC tends to be profligate. This reflects AIC’s tendency to pick 
longer lags in large samples. The promising observation, however, is that the sign 
distortion on 
*
2 ˆ a  remains unchanged regardless the VAR order and whether  21 f  is zero or 
not. This indicates that we can apply the sign rule even with higher order VAR models.  
The tables also show the creation of contemporaneous correlations between the error 
processes that result from the shrinkage of the VAR order towards unity. It should be 
noted that a co-integrated VAR(1) process in the non-aggregate form does not create 
contemporaneous correlations with temporal aggregation.  The contemporaneous 
correlation is such a case is a clear indication of omitted variables. In other words, 
contemporaneous correlation in an aggregated VAR process may be due to both temporal 
aggregation and omitted variables. 
================ 
Tables 6 and 7 
================   20 
6. Applications 
6.1 Exchange rate, direct vs. cross 
The relationship between the three major exchange rates, US$, Deutsch Mark (DM) and 
Japanese Yen, provides a good illustration of how the sign rule works under 
unidirectional causality. Theoretically the direct Yen/DM rate should be the same as the 
cross rate derived from US$/DM and US$/Yen rates. Any deviations will open up 
arbitrage opportunities for profiteering. However, some deviations may still be observed 
when transaction costs are higher than the potential profits. Therefore, log(Yen/DM) – 
log(US$/DM) + log(US$/Yen) forms a co-integrating relation with the co-integrating 
vector (1, -1, 1). Figure 1 shows the deviations of the daily direct rate from the cross rate. 
As can be expected these deviations are very small and center around zero. Somewhat 
surprisingly, though, they show some heteroscedastic behavior. Both AIC and SBC pick 
a VAR(1) for the three rates (Yen/DM, US$/DM, US$/Yen) all in logarithms.  The 
residual correlation matrix is not diagonal that reflects the systematic sampling of the 
daily rates. Although the residuals are free from serial correlation, both normality and 
heteroscadasticity tests fail. We ignore this and proceed to estimate the adjustment 
coefficients by imposing the above co-integrating vector.
13  The results (based on 
Johansen ML method) are reported in Table 8. The results under both daily rates and 
systematically sampled weekly rates show that only  1 a  is non-zero. This is also what we 
expect apriori. However, under temporally averaged weekly rates both  1 a  and  3 a  turn 
out to be non-zero. Nevertheless, the wrong sign of  3 a  provides the warning sign. 
Combined with non-sample information that only  1 a  could be non-zero we could safely 
                                                 
13  The estimated cointegrating vector virtually coincide with (1, -1, 1) vector under both systematic 
sampling and temporal aggregation.   21 
conclude that non-zero  3 a  is a result of temporal averaging. Constraining both  2 a  and 
3 a  to zero also brings the estimate of  1 a  closer to unity. 
================= 
Figure 1 and Table 8 
================= 
 
6.2 Stock Market and Car Quota Premium in Singapore 
This is an interesting example because one variable is available in non-aggregate form. 
To curb the car population, the Singapore government implemented a car quota system in 
August 1990. To buy a new car the buyers first have to buy a piece of paper called the 
certificate of entitlement. The price of this paper, known as the quota premium (QP), is 
decided through a monthly bidding process. The monthly data of QP are not 
contaminated by any form of aggregation or systematic sampling. 
  A key determinant of QP of luxury cars is the performance of the stock market, 
captured by the stock price index compiled by the Stock Exchange of Singapore (Lai, 
2001). Monthly data over 1990M8-1999M4 show that these two variables (in logarithms) 
are cointegrated and their relationship is well represented by a VAR(1) process with  
causality running from stock price to QP. Stock prices (in log) follow a random walk. 
Moreover, the two error processes are also uncorrelated ( 0 12 = s ). We write the ECM 
formulation as: 
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where y = ln(QP) and x = ln(Stock price index),  0 2 = a . Because of the short data span 
we temporally averaged data up to six months. The results for m=1 (no aggregation) 
through m=6 are given in Table 9. The results show that  2 ˆ b  remains roughly the same as 
m increases. Being a cointegrated VAR(1) with  0 12 = s  temporal aggregation does not 
create contemporaneous correlation between the residual processes ( 12 r  remains close to 
zero). However, the magnitude of 
*
1 ˆ a  increases steadily and remains highly significant. 
The magnitude of 
*
2 ˆ a  also tends to increase though not steadily and becomes statistically 
significant at the 10% level when m=4 and m=6. If one had only the temporally averaged 
data (say biannual) the wrong (negative) sign of 
*
2 ˆ a  provides the warning signal. 
Combined with the information that (log) stock prices follows a random walk one could 




6.3 Tax Revenue and Government Expenditure in the US 
Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing hypothesis offers an interesting contrast to Granger 
causality testing. Under the assumption that spending causes taxes Barro’s model implies 
that the income tax rate follows a random walk. If the tax rate truly follows a random 
walk, the standard Granger-causality test w ill fail to establish the causal direction 
embodied in Barro’s model. Since taxes following a random walk could be consistent 
with some other hypotheses, many researchers have tested the tax smoothing hypothesis 
by testing the other implications of the model, see for example, Sahasakul (1986), Huang   23 
and Lin (1993) and Ghosh (1995). Hoover (2001), however, applied his intervention 
approach to test for the causal direction between taxes and spending and observed mixed 
results over different time periods. Hoover used quarterly data from 1947 to 1989 in his 
analysis. In this section we use annual data (1946-2002) and examine how cointegration 
and the sign rule shed light on the causal direction between taxes and spending.  
The data series used in this section are the following.
14  T = real federal 
government receipts (nominal series deflated by the GNP deflator, P), G = real federal 
government expenditure net of interest payments (nominal series deflated by P), Y = real 
GNP,  Y y ln = ,  y D =GNP growth rate (%),  p = ( P ln D )100 = inflation rate,  t = 
(T/Y)100 = income tax rate and g = (G/Y)100 = spending rate. Data plot and ADF tests 
support the assumption that t, g, and p are I(1) processes. 
The literature usually focuses on the budget surplus as a ratio of GNP,  t-g. 
Figure 2 plots this data series. Although the tax smoothing hypothesis predicts t-g to be a 
stationary series (see Huang and Lin, 1993; Ghosh, 1995)  the plot in Figure 2 casts 
doubts on the stationarity of the series. An ADF regression with two lags of  D(t-g)t 
produces a t statistic of -2.62 which is insignificant at the 5% critical value of -2.92. In 
fact the  t-g series suggests some level shifts: on average a budget surplus in the period 
1946-1970, a deficit in the period 1971-1993 and a large surplus in the period 1994-2002.  
Although the budget surplus (t-g) may not necessarily be stationary,  t and g 
form a strong cointegrating relationship with a different cointegrating vector. An OLS 
regression of  t on g produces highly stable recursive parameter estimates with some 
small departures occurring after 1994. Based on average recursive OLS estimates we 
                                                 
14  The data series were taken from the same source that Hoover (2001) used, National Income and Product 
Accounts as reported in CITIBASE.    24 
obtain the cointegrating relation  13 25 . 0 - - t = t t t g z . This series is plotted in Figure 3.  
An ADF regression based on one lag of  t z D  produces a t = -4.155 which is significant at 
the 1% critical value of -3.552.  
We use the following specification to examine the adjustment coefficients  1 a  and 
2 a ,   1 a  is expected to be negative and  2 a  positive. Following Hoover (2001) we use 
t y D  and  t p D  to remove non-policy effects from  t D  and  g D .
15 
  t t t t t t t z y g 1 1 1 4 3 1 2 1 1 0 e + a + p D d + D d + D d + t D d + d = t D - - -       (19a) 
  t t t t t t z y g g 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 0 e + a + D l + D l + t D l + l = D - - -        (19b) 
FIML estimation of (19a) and (19b) produces results very similar to OLS estimates 
because the two error processes are empirically uncorrelated. We, therefore, proceed with 
OLS estimation. Figures 4 and 5 plot the recursive estimates from the two regressions. 
Figure 4 shows that the parameter estimates of the tax equation become unstable after 
1994, the period of high budget surplus.
16 Nevertheless, the adjustment coefficient 
estimate  1 ˆ a  has the correct sign and is statistically significant. The parameter estimates 
of the spending equation shown in Figure 5 are more stable even during the high-budget-
surplus period. But only the GNP growth rate and the constant term are statistically 
significant. After dropping the insignificant variables we obtain the following estimates 
over the period 1946-1994.
17 
 
                                                 
15  Hoover (2001) uses taxes and spending as a ratio of potential GNP to obtain the tax rate and the 
spending rate. He then regresses the tax rate on GNP-gap and inflation rate and the spending rate on the 
GNP-gap and uses the residuals from these regressions to study the causal direction. We also tried this 
approach but the measurement errors in potential GNP seem to cause parameter instabilities. 
16  The analysis after 1994 seems to require additional variables in the model. 
17  The estimated equations pass the diagnostic tests available in PCGive except that the spending equation 
shows a mild heteroscadasticity. These results are not reported for brevity.    25 
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The adjustment coefficient in (20a) has the  correct sign and highly significant. The 
adjustment coefficient in (20b) is statistically insignificant.  These results show that 
causality (in levels) runs from spending to taxes that concurs with Barro’s assumption. 
We have to note, however, that the recursive estimates of the adjustment coefficient in 
(20b), though statistically insignificant, are highly stable and bear the correct sign. Our 
previous results on the sign distortion indicate that a pure unidirectional relation produces 
an  0 ˆ 2 < a  after temporal aggregation. Therefore, the correct sign of  2 ˆ a  in (20b) seems to 
have resulted from a mild feedback system in the non-aggregate process. It should also be 
noted that (20a) clearly rejects a major implication of the tax smoothing hypothesis that 
the tax rate (adjusted for the effect of  t y D  and  t p D ) is a random walk.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Invariance of cointegrating  relationships to temporal aggregation offers a promising path 
for Granger causality testing. In this paper we propose using the error correction 
formulation to infer the direction of causality between cointegrated variables. Temporal 
aggregation distorts both the short-run coefficients and the adjustment coefficients in an 
error correction model. Fortunately, unlike the short-run coefficients, the distortions on 
the adjustment coefficients occur with a predictable sign-distortion. Based on these   26 
findings we propose a sign-rule for making causal inferences from temporally aggregated 
data.  
Causal inference based on cointegration should be referred to as causality in 
levels as opposed to causality in differences found in the short-run coefficients (Hendry 
and Mizon, 1998). As we discussed in the text, causality found  in the short-run 
coefficients, regardless the distortions due to temporal aggregation, is less useful for 
policy analyses because policy variables in general show feedback effects. Causality in 
levels, however, plays an important role in policy evaluations because of its connection to 
super-exogeniety. 
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Appendix: The relationship between covariances of aggregate and non-aggregate 
processes 
 
Temporal aggregation involves the construction of non-overlapping sums that can easily 
be obtained by defining the overlapping sum  t
m y L L ) ... 1 (
1 - + + +  and then systematically 
sampling this variable at every  mth interval to obtain the aggregated variable  t Y  = 
t m
m y L L ) ... 1 (
1 - + + + , (t =1,2,…,N; T=mN). Let  t
d
t y L w ) 1 ( - =  and  t t Y L W
d ) 1 ( - = . The 
following result extends the univariate case considered by Stram and Wei (1986). (See 
Gulasekaran (2003) for further details.) 
 
Proposition A.1 
The covariance between the temporally aggregated series Wit and Wjt-k  can be expressed 
in terms of the covariance between the non-aggregate series  it w  and  k jt w -  as, for  0 ‡ k : 
)) 1 )( 1 ( ( ) ... 1 (     ) (
2 1 2 - + + + + + + =
+ + - m d mk L L L k j
w
ij
d d m W
ij
j i g g       (A.1) 
)) 1 )( 1 ( ( ) ... 1 (      ) (
) 1 ( 2 1 2 - + + + + + + =





i g g       (A.2) 
where  ) , ( ) ( k j i
W
ij W W Cov k - = t t g ,  ) , ( ) ( k jt it
w
ij w w Cov k - = g , L operates on the index of  ) (k ij g  




ij - =g g  and  i d  and  j d  are integers representing 
orders of differencing applied to ith and jth series respectively.   28 
Proof 
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Table 1: Unidirectional Causality:
*
1 ˆ lim a p  when  0 2 = a ,  1 1 = b  and  1 1 a r + =  
 
1 a across/ 
2 b  down  -1.95  -1.75  -1.5  -1.25  -1.0  -0.75  -0.5  -0.25  -0.05 
m=3 
-20  -2.06  -2.31  -2.43  -2.29  -2.00  -1.63  -1.20  -0.67  -0.15 
-10  -2.05  -2.31  -2.43  -2.28  -1.99  -1.63  -1.19  -0.67  -0.15 
-8  -2.05  -2.30  -2.42  -2.27  -1.98  -1.62  -1.19  -0.66  -0.15 
-6  -2.05  -2.29  -2.40  -2.26  -1.97  -1.61  -1.19  -0.66  -0.15 
-4  -2.04  -2.26  -2.36  -2.22  -1.94  -1.59  -1.17  -0.65  -0.14 
-2  -2.02  -2.14  -2.19  -2.05  -1.80  -1.49  -1.10  -0.62  -0.14 
-1  -1.96  -1.88  -1.81  -1.68  -1.50  -1.26  -0.96  -0.55  -0.12 
m=12 
-20  -7.76  -9.18  -8.88  -7.81  -6.49  -5.05  -3.56  -2.01  -0.53 
-10  -7.71  -9.12  -8.82  -7.76  -6.45  -5.02  -3.54  -2.00  -0.53 
-8  -7.67  -9.08  -8.78  -7.72  -6.42  -5.00  -3.52  -2.00  -0.53 
-6  -7.59  -8.99  -8.69  -7.64  -6.35  -4.95  -3.49  -1.98  -0.53 
-4  -7.38  -8.73  -8.44  -7.43  -6.18  -4.82  -3.41  -1.94  -0.52 
-2  -6.44  -7.58  -7.33  -6.47  -5.40  -4.24  -3.04  -1.77  -0.49 
-1  -4.44  -5.15  -4.98  -4.42  -3.75  -3.02  -2.25  -1.41  -0.43 
  These values are the same for  2 b >0.   33 
 
Table 2: Unidirectional Causality:  ) ˆ (
*
1 a t  when  0 2 = a ,  1 1 = b and  1 1 a r + =  
1 a across/ 
2 b  down  -1.95  -1.75  -1.5  -1.25  -1.0  -0.75  -0.5  -0.25  -0.05 
Panel 1: T=150, m=3, N=50 
-20  -13.6  -8.0  -7.9  -8.4  -9.2  -10.5  -12.9  -18.2  -31.2 
-10  -13.6  -8.0  -7.9  -8.4  -9.2  -10.5  -12.7  -17.5  -20.5 
-8  -13.6  -8.0  -7.9  -8.4  -9.2  -10.5  -12.6  -17.1  -17.2 
-6  -13.7  -8.0  -7.8  -8.4  -9.2  -10.4  -12.5  -16.2  -13.4 
-4  -13.8  -8.0  -7.8  -8.3  -9.1  -10.2  -12.0  -14.3  -9.3 
-2  -14.4  -7.9  -7.5  -7.9  -8.6  -9.4  -10.3  -9.9  -4.9 
-1  -16.4  -8.1  -7.1  -7.2  -7.7  -8.1  -7.9  -6.3  -2.8 
Panel 2: T=600, m=12, N=50 
-20  -4.5  -5.4  -5.8  -6.0  -6.3  -6.5  -6.9  -8.2  -16.2 
-10  -4.4  -5.3  -5.8  -6.0  -6.2  -6.4  -6.8  -8.1  -15.6 
-8  -4.4  -5.3  -5.8  -6.0  -6.2  -6.4  -6.8  -8.1  -15.1 
-6  -4.4  -5.3  -5.7  -6.0  -6.1  -6.4  -6.8  -8.0  -14.4 
-4  -4.4  -5.1  -5.6  -5.8  -6.0  -6.3  -6.7  -7.9  -12.7 
-2  -4.0  -4.7  -5.1  -5.3  -5.5  -5.8  -6.2  -7.4  -8.7 
-1  -3.4  -3.8  -4.1  -4.3  -4.5  -4.8  -5.3  -6.5  -5.4 
Panel 3: T=600, m=3, N=200 
-20  -27.2  -16.0  -15.8  -16.9  -18.4  -21.0  -25.7  -36.3  -62.4 
-10  -27.3  -16.0  -15.8  -16.9  -18.4  -21.0  -25.5  -35.0  -41.0 
-8  -27.3  -16.0  -15.8  -16.8  -18.4  -20.9  -25.3  -34.1  -34.3 
-6  -27.4  -16.0  -15.7  -16.8  -18.3  -20.8  -24.9  -32.3  -26.8 
-4  -27.6  -16.0  -15.5  -16.5  -18.1  -20.3  -24.0  -28.5  -18.6 
-2  -28.8  -15.9  -15.0  -15.8  -17.1  -18.9  -20.7  -19.8  -9.8 
-1  -32.8  -16.2  -14.2  -14.5  -15.3  -16.1  -15.8  -12.5  -5.6 
These values are the same for  2 b >0.   34 
Table 3: Unidirectional Causality:
*
2 ˆ lim a p  when  0 2 = a ,  1 1 = b  and  1 1 a r + =  
1 a across/ 
2 b  down  -1.95  -1.75  -1.5  -1.25  -1.0  -0.75  -0.5  -0.25  -0.05 
m=3 
-20  -0.01  -0.04  -0.06  -0.06  -0.05  -0.04  -0.02  -0.01  -0.00 
-10  -0.02  -0.09  -0.12  -0.12  -0.10  -0.07  -0.05  -0.02  -0.00 
-8  -0.02  -0.11  -0.15  -0.15  -0.12  -0.09  -0.06  -0.03  -0.01 
-6  -0.03  -0.14  -0.20  -0.20  -0.16  -0.12  -0.08  -0.04  -0.01 
-4  -0.05  -0.21  -0.29  -0.29  -0.24  -0.17  -0.11  -0.05  -0.01 
-2  -0.08  -0.35  -0.50  -0.49  -0.40  -0.30  -0.19  -0.09  -0.02 
-1  -0.10  -0.44  -0.63  -0.61  -0.50  -0.37  -0.24  -0.12  -0.02 
1  0.10  0.44  0.63  0.61  0.50  0.37  0.24  0.12  0.02 
2  0.08  0.35  0.50  0.49  0.40  0.30  0.19  0.09  0.02 
4  0.05  0.21  0.29  0.29  0.24  0.17  0.11  0.05  0.01 
6  0.03  0.14  0.20  0.20  0.16  0.12  0.08  0.04  0.01 
8  0.02  0.11  0.15  0.15  0.12  0.09  0.06  0.03  0.01 
10  0.02  0.09  0.12  0.12  0.10  0.07  0.05  0.02  0.00 
20  0.01  0.04  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.00 
m=12 
-20  -0.33  -0.40  -0.39  -0.34  -0.27  -0.20  -0.13  -0.06  -0.01 
-10  -0.66  -0.80  -0.78  -0.67  -0.54  -0.40  -0.26  -0.12  -0.02 
-8  -0.82  -1.00  -0.97  -0.84  -0.68  -0.50  -0.32  -0.15  -0.03 
-6  -1.08  -1.31  -1.27  -1.10  -0.89  -0.66  -0.43  -0.19  -0.03 
-4  -1.57  -1.91  -1.85  -1.60  -1.29  -0.96  -0.62  -0.28  -0.05 
-2  -2.67  -3.24  -3.14  -2.72  -2.20  -1.63  -1.05  -0.48  -0.08 
-1  -3.34  -4.05  -3.93  -3.40  -2.75  -2.04  -1.31  -0.60  -0.10 
1  3.34  4.05  3.93  3.40  2.75  2.04  1.31  0.60  0.10 
2  2.67  3.24  3.14  2.72  2.20  1.63  1.05  0.48  0.08 
4  1.57  1.91  1.85  1.60  1.29  0.96  0.62  0.28  0.05 
6  1.08  1.31  1.27  1.10  0.89  0.66  0.43  0.19  0.03 
8  0.82  1.00  0.97  0.84  0.68  0.50  0.32  0.15  0.03 
10  0.66  0.80  0.78  0.67  0.54  0.40  0.26  0.12  0.02 
20  0.33  0.40  0.39  0.34  0.27  0.20  0.13  0.06  0.01 
   35 
Table 4: Unidirectional Causality: ) ˆ (
*
2 a t  when  0 2 = a ,  1 1 = b and  1 1 a r + =  
1 a across/ 
2 b  down  -1.95  -1.75  -1.5  -1.25  -1.0  -0.75  -0.5  -0.25  -0.05 
Panel 1: T=150, m=3, N=50 
-20  -1.1  -2.4  -3.1  -3.2  -3.1  -2.7  -2.2  -1.6  -0.7 
-10  -1.1  -2.4  -3.1  -3.2  -3.0  -2.7  -2.2  -1.5  -0.7 
-8  -1.1  -2.4  -3.1  -3.2  -3.0  -2.7  -2.2  -1.5  -0.7 
-6  -1.0  -2.3  -3.1  -3.2  -3.0  -2.6  -2.2  -1.5  -0.7 
-4  -1.0  -2.3  -3.0  -3.1  -3.0  -2.6  -2.1  -1.5  -0.7 
-2  -1.0  -2.1  -2.7  -2.9  -2.7  -2.3  -2.0  -1.4  -0.6 
-1  -0.7  -1.7  -2.1  -2.2  -2.1  -1.8  -1.5  -1.1  -0.5 
1  0.7  1.7  2.1  2.2  2.1  1.8  1.5  1.1  0.5 
2  1.0  2.1  2.7  2.9  2.7  2.3  2.0  1.4  0.6 
4  1.0  2.3  3.0  3.1  3.0  2.6  2.1  1.5  0.7 
6  1.0  2.3  3.1  3.2  3.0  2.6  2.2  1.5  0.7 
8  1.1  2.4  3.1  3.2  3.0  2.7  2.2  1.5  0.7 
10  1.1  2.4  3.1  3.2  3.0  2.7  2.2  1.5  0.7 
20  1.1  2.4  3.1  3.2  3.1  2.7  2.2  1.6  0.7 
Panel 2: T=600, m=12, N=50 
-40  -3.7  -4.5  -4.8  -4.9  -4.8  -4.6  -4.1  -3.2  -1.6 
-20  -3.7  -4.5  -4.8  -4.9  -4.8  -4.6  -4.1  -3.2  -1.6 
-10  -3.6  -4.4  -4.8  -4.8  -4.8  -4.5  -4.1  -3.2  -1.6 
-8  -3.6  -4.4  -4.8  -4.8  -4.8  -4.5  -4.1  -3.2  -1.5 
-6  -3.6  -4.4  -4.7  -4.8  -4.7  -4.5  -4.1  -3.2  -1.5 
-4  -3.5  -4.2  -4.6  -4.6  -4.6  -4.4  -4.0  -3.1  -1.5 
-2  -3.2  -3.9  -4.1  -4.1  -4.1  -3.9  -3.6  -2.9  -1.4 
-1  -2.4  -2.9  -3.1  -3.1  -3.1  -2.9  -2.7  -2.2  -1.1 
1  2.4  2.9  3.1  3.1  3.1  2.9  2.7  2.2  1.1 
2  3.2  3.9  4.1  4.1  4.1  3.9  3.6  2.9  1.4 
4  3.5  4.2  4.6  4.6  4.6  4.4  4.0  3.1  1.5 
6  3.6  4.4  4.7  4.8  4.7  4.5  4.1  3.2  1.5 
8  3.6  4.4  4.8  4.8  4.8  4.5  4.1  3.2  1.5 
10  3.6  4.4  4.8  4.8  4.8  4.5  4.1  3.2  1.6 
20  3.7  4.5  4.8  4.9  4.8  4.6  4.1  3.2  1.6 
Panel 3: T=600, m=3, N=200 
-20  -2.1  -4.8  -6.3  -6.5  -6.1  -5.4  -4.4  -3.1  -1.3 
-10  -2.1  -4.8  -6.3  -6.5  -6.0  -5.4  -4.4  -3.0  -1.3 
-8  -2.1  -4.8  -6.3  -6.5  -6.0  -5.4  -4.4  -3.0  -1.3 
-6  -2.0  -4.7  -6.1  -6.4  -6.0  -5.3  -4.4  -3.0  -1.3 
-4  -2.0  -4.7  -6.0  -6.3  -5.9  -5.1  -4.2  -3.0  -1.3 
-2  -1.9  -4.2  -5.5  -5.7  -5.4  -4.7  -3.9  -2.8  -1.2 
-1  -1.5  -3.3  -4.2  -4.4  -4.1  -3.7  -3.0  -2.2  -1.0 
1  1.5  3.3  4.2  4.4  4.1  3.7  3.0  2.2  1.0 
2  1.9  4.2  5.5  5.7  5.4  4.7  3.9  2.8  1.2 
4  2.0  4.7  6.0  6.3  5.9  5.1  4.2  3.0  1.3 
6  2.0  4.7  6.1  6.4  6.0  5.3  4.4  3.0  1.3 
8  2.1  4.8  6.3  6.5  6.0  5.4  4.4  3.0  1.3 
10  2.1  4.8  6.3  6.5  6.0  5.4  4.4  3.0  1.3 
20  2.1  4.8  6.3  6.5  6.1  5.4  4.4  3.1  1.3   36 
Table 5: Mutual Causality: ) ˆ (
*
2 a t  when  1 1 = b ,  0 = r  and  2 1 2 / ) 1 ( b a r a - - =  
1 a across/ 
2 b  down  -0.95  -0.85  -0.75  -0.65  -0.55  -0.45  -0.35  -0.25  -0.15  -0.05 
Panel 1: T=150, m=3, N=50 
-20  -2.9  -2.3  -1.8  -1.2  -0.4  0.4  1.5  2.8  4.2  6.0 
-10  -2.9  -2.3  -1.8  -1.1  -0.4  0.5  1.6  2.8  4.3  6.0 
-8  -2.8  -2.3  -1.8  -1.1  -0.3  0.5  1.6  2.9  4.3  6.1 
-6  -2.8  -2.3  -1.7  -1.1  -0.3  0.6  1.6  2.9  4.4  6.1 
-4  -2.7  -2.2  -1.6  -1.0  -0.2  0.7  1.8  3.1  4.5  6.1 
-2  -2.4  -1.8  -1.2  -0.4  0.4  1.5  2.5  3.7  5.1  6.4 
-1  -1.7  -0.9  0.0  1.0  2.1  3.2  4.3  5.4  6.4  7.3 
Panel 2: T=600, m=12, N=50 
-20  -4.7  -4.5  -4.4  -4.1  -3.7  -3.3  -2.6  -1.6  0.1  3.6 
-10  -4.7  -4.5  -4.3  -4.0  -3.7  -3.2  -2.5  -1.5  0.3  3.3 
-8  -4.6  -4.5  -4.2  -4.0  -3.6  -3.1  -2.4  -1.3  0.3  3.2 
-6  -4.6  -4.4  -4.2  -3.9  -3.5  -3.0  -2.2  -1.2  0.5  3.0 
-4  -4.5  -4.2  -4.0  -3.7  -3.2  -2.6  -1.8  -0.7  0.9  2.9 
-2  -4.0  -3.6  -3.2  -2.7  -2.1  -1.2  -0.3  0.8  2.0  3.1 
-1  -2.8  -2.2  -1.5  -0.7  0.2  1.2  2.1  2.9  3.6  4.2 
Panel 3: T=600, m=3, N=200 
-20  -5.7  -4.7  -3.6  -2.3  -0.8  0.9  3.0  5.6  8.5  12.1 
-10  -5.7  -4.7  -3.6  -2.2  -0.8  1.0  3.1  5.6  8.6  12.1 
-8  -5.6  -4.7  -3.6  -2.2  -0.7  1.0  3.1  5.7  8.6  12.2 
-6  -5.6  -4.6  -3.5  -2.1  -0.7  1.1  3.2  5.8  8.7  12.2 
-4  -5.5  -4.5  -3.2  -1.9  -0.3  1.5  3.6  6.1  8.9  12.3 
-2  -4.8  -3.7  -2.3  -0.8  0.9  2.9  5.0  7.5  10.2  12.9 
-1  -3.4  -1.8  0.0  2.0  4.1  6.3  8.6  10.8  12.8  14.5 
For  2 b >0 the table entries are the same with the opposite sign.  37 
Table 6: Monte Carlo Results based on VAR(2):  21 f =0 
  AIC choice of VAR order, %  SBC choice of VAR order ,%  % of negative 
*
2 ˆ a   Average contemporaneous 
correlation between residuals 
  VAR(1)  VAR(2)  VAR(3)  VAR(1)  VAR(2)  VAR(3)  VAR(1)  VAR(2)  VAR(3)  VAR(1)  VAR(2)  VAR(3) 
m=3  0.0  8.3  91.8  0.0  80.9  19.1  91.5  100  94.7  0.620  0.640  0.650 
m=12  4.0  82.8  13.3  73.3  26.7  0.0  100  100  100  0.978  0.977  0.977 




Table 7: Monte Carlo Results based on VAR(2):  21 f =0.25 
  AIC choice of VAR order, %  SBC choice of VAR order ,%  % of negative 
*
2 ˆ a   Average contemporaneous 
correlation between residuals 
  VAR(1)  VAR(2)  VAR(3)  VAR(1)  VAR(2)  VAR(3)  VAR(1)  VAR(2)  VAR(3)  VAR(1)  VAR(2)  VAR(3) 
m=3  0  0  100  0  17.4  82.7  100  100  100  0.850  0.780  0.780 
m=12  1.2  87.2  11.7  52.8  47.2  0  100  100  100  0.991  0.991  0.991 
m=60  40.9  51.8  7.4  97.8  2.25  0  100  100  100  0.999  0.999  0.999   38 
Table 8.  Estimated adjustment coefficients  




Daily rates  Weekly rates 
 End of period  
Weekly rates 
Average  





















Sample size  922  184  184 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * indicates the absolute values bigger than 
2SE. If  2 a  and  3 a  are restricted to zero the estimates of  1 a  in columns 3 and 4 move closer 




Table 9. Estimates for car quota premium and stock price example 
 
*
1 ˆ a  
*
2 ˆ a   2 ˆ b   12 r   N 
m=1  -0.191 (0.048) -0.003 (0.007)  -3.71  -0.02  104 
m=2  -0.230 (0.062) -0.016 (0.013)  -3.56  -0.10  51 
m=3  -0.342 (0.093) -0.015 (0.021)  -3.74  -0.02  34 
m=4  -0.368 (0.109) -0.046 (0.026)  -2.79  0.12  25 
m=5  -0.483 (0.133) -0.027 (0.036)  -3.06  -0.04  20 
m=6  -0.572 (0.095) -0.088 (0.044)  -3.25  -0.01  16 
12 r  is the contemporaneous correlation of residuals. N is the effective sample size. The 
numbers in parentheses are standard errors.   39 
 
 









Figure 1. Deviations of logarithms of daily Yen/DM direct rate from the cross rate  
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Figure 3. Cointegrating relation between tax rate and spending rate 
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Note: Outer lines show the 2SE confidence bands. The error correction term is  1 - t z . 
 
Figure 4. OLS recursive estimates of the tax equation.   42 
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Note: Outer lines show the 2SE confidence bands. The error correction term is 1 - t z . 
 
Figure 5. OLS recursive estimates of the spending equation. 
 